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Licensing the Exportation of Nuclear
Materials: Responsibility to the Global
Environment
By

ELIZABETH ANN LAWRENCE

Member of the Class of 1983

I.

INTRODUCTION

The policy of the United States to supply nuclear plants and
materials to selected foreign nations raises questions of responsibility
towards the environment. As an exporting nation with experience and
expertise in nuclear technology, the United States should consider the
environmental risks entailed in these activities. The United States gov-

ernment has also expressed a vital interest in ensuring that the materials exported for energy uses not be converted into nuclear weaponry.
At the same time, however, delicate foreign relations impose other con-

siderations upon the export scenario, including respect for the sovereignty of the recipient nation and foreign national pride. These latter

considerations may inhibit accomplishment of the weaponry objectives,
thus suggesting that all of these factors must be considered and bal-

anced prior to the licensing of a nuclear export.
This Note will examine the attempt by Congress to weigh these
factors and the success of the resulting statutory scheme. The imple-

mentation of the congressional plan by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the agency charged with licensing nuclear plants and

materials for export, was recently challenged in court by a coalition of
environmental and citizens' groups.2 In Natural Resources Defense
1. The NRC, successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was created
by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Where the AEC was charged with the potentially conflicting duties of promotion and regulation of the nuclear power industry. the
NRC's task is solely regulatory. The Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) was given the responsibility of research and development of nuclear energy. Pub.
L. 93-438,88 Stat. 1233 (1974), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5811-5814, 5841. ERDA was abolished and the
Department of Energy created by Pub. L. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977), 42 U.S.C. § 7151.
2. The petitioners in the appeal to the court of appeals were the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), Philippine Movement for Environmental Protection. Union
of Concerned Scientists, Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, and Center for Development
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Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter NRDC v.

NRC), 3 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals sustained the
NRC's grant of a license for export of a nuclear plant and component
materials to the Philippines. This Note examines the two sometimes

contradictory opinions in this case, which as yet are the only judicial
interpretations of the relationship of the relevant statutes and concludes

that the court failed to provide adequate guidance for either the NRC
or subsequent litigation.
The initial focus of discussion will be the history of the export to
the Philippines and the numerous safety concerns posed by the proposed plant. The relevant statutes, the Atomic Energy Act as amended

by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act, are next examined in an attempt to discern the statutes'
intended application and reach. The logic and precedential value of
the two opinions of the court of appeals will also be explored.
II.
A.

THE PHILIPPINES EXPORT

History

The involvement of the United States government in the development of nuclear power in the Philippines began in 1955. Following

President Eisenhower's proposal of an "Atoms for Peace Program"' to
the United Nations General Assembly in 1953, the United States and
the Philippine governments agreed to cooperate and exchange informa-

tion in an effort to exploit the peaceful application of nuclear technology.5 In 1968, the United States reaffarmed its commitment to the
Policy. Respondents were the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
United States of America. Westinghouse Electric Corporation was an intervenor, and the
Republic of the Philippines filed an amicus curiae brief. Final orders of the NRC arc sub.
ject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2231,
2339(b) (1976).
3. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as NRDC v. NRC].
4. With the advent of the Atoms for Peace Program, the United States began to actively encourage the civil use of atomic energy. Research reactors were disseminated widely,
becoming a "new international status symbol." H.R. REP. No. 95-587, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. Prior to this program, the United States had
attempted to maintain a monopoly in the field of nuclear energy and weapons. By 1954, the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had tested nuclear weapons, while other countries
were pursuing the harnessing of the atom. The Atoms for Peace Program was an acknowledgement that cooperation, not isolation, would best enable the United States to shape the
direction of other nations' nuclear activities. NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP,
NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES AND CHOICES 275 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR ENERGY
POLICY STUDY GROUP].

5. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, July 27, 1955,
United States-Philippines, 6 U.S.T. 2671, T.I.A.S. No. 3316.
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Philippine nuclear program through another agreement for cooperation which provided for the exchange of information and authorized
the sale to the Philippines of nuclear materials and equipment for research and power application. 6

The Philippine government had been preparing for the implementation of nuclear power since 1958, when the Philippine Atomic Energy

Commission (PAEC) was established as an agency within the Ministry
of Energy.7 The PAEC is responsible for developing and regulating

nuclear activities, including licensing and siting nuclear power reactors.
In 1960, based upon recommendations of an advisory board, the Philippine government requested the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA)8 to survey the potential for nuclear energy in the Republic.
The IAEA reported that there were sufficient economic and "other

important reasons" to warrant serious consideration of the installation
of a nuclear power plant in the Luzon area of the nation.9 In 1968, the

Philippine legislature approved a broad legal framework that gave
PAEC the responsibility for plant licensing and established the applicable criteria. ° Upon the receipt of further feasibility studies conducted

by the IAEA, President Marcos announced that the National Power
Corporation (NPC), a governmental corporation," would acquire and
6. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 13,
1968, United States-Philippines, 19 U.S.T. 5389, T.I.A.S. No. 6522. Under article IliA, exports are subject to the applicable laws, regulations, and licensing regulations of the United
States. See infra note 39.
7. Amicus Brief of the Government of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 2067, at 4
(The Science Act of 1958).
8. IAEA is an autonomous organization under the aegis of the United Nations. Created by statute entered into force July 29, 1957, openedfor signature October 26. 1956, 8
U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; amended Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135,
T.I.A.S. No. 5284, 471 U.N.T.S. 334. Established to promote the peaceful and safe use of
atomic energy, the agency encourages research and the exchange of information and implements safeguards against the military use of materials, among other tasks. Arts. 2, 3. The
potential conffict inherent in assigning one body the tasks of both promotion and regulation
have been recognized. 1AEA ProgramofSafeguards HearingsBefore the Com=a on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 101 (1981) (testimony of Victor Gilinsky,
Commissioner, NRC). A similar concern prompted the splitting of the Atomic Energy
Commission into two distinct agencies. See supra note 1.
9. Amicus Brief of the Government of Philippines at 6, IAEA Report of Aug. 1961.
Non-economic considerations may include the desire to develop a diversified energy base to
increase the security of supply, create greater economic independence and political prestige.
and establish a technical base for optional nuclear weapons. NUCLEAR ENERGY Pot.tCv
STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 6-7.
10. Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968, Republic Act No. 5207 (Philippines), May 15, 1967, cited in Amicus Brief of the Government of the Phillipines at 7.
11. The NPC owns, operates, and coordinates 90% of Filipino electrical generating
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On June 17, 1974, the NPC agreed to purchase from Westinghouse
Electric Corporation the services and equipment for a 620 megawatt
nuclear power plant, to be constructed at Napot Point. The commit3
ment was formalized in a contract dated February 9, 1976. 1

Throughout this time, the United States government had encouraged the Philippines in its pursuit of nuclear power. In January
1971 the United States embassy in Manila was instructed by the State
Department to "give all possible encouragement" to the Philippine
government in the decision to purchase a nuclear plant.' * In January
1976 the Export-Import Bank of the United States authorized loans
and loan guarantees of over $600 million to the NPC for the purchase
of the plant from Westinghouse and of the initial fuel for the reactor
core. 15

At the request of the PAEC, the NRC reviewed the preliminary

Site Investigation Report prepared by EBASCO Overseas Services,
Inc., a United States subsidiary of an architecture-engineering firm,
and provided comments to the PAEC in 1977.,6
Westinghouse filed a license application with the NRC on Novem-

ber 18, 1976, seeking permission to export a nuclear reactor to the Philippines. The Commission forwarded the application to the executive
branch,' 7 which responded on December 12, 1977, with a recommendation that the NRC issue the license. The Department of State, however, wanted further time to study the export, and on January 25, 1978,

requested the NRC to defer action. t8 One of the State Department's
major concerns was the suitability and safety of the proposed reactor
power. All generating facilities were nationalized in November, 1972. NRDC v. NRC,
supra note 3, at 1356 n.49.
12. Amicus Brief of the Government of the Philippines at 8, Republic Act No. 6395
(Philippines). The plant is referred to as the Philippines Nuclear Power Project No. I or
PNPP-I. It is located at Napot Point, Municipality of Morong, Province of Bataan, on the
island of Luzon (45 miles west of Manila). NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1351.
13. Amicus Brief of Philippine Government at 3.
14. Petitioner's Brief at 7, Cable from the Department of State, dated Feb. 8, 1971,
"Meralco's Expansion Program," to United States Embassy, Manila.
15. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1351.
16. In re Westinghouse Electrical Corp. (Exports to the Philippines) I1 N.R.C. 631, 655
n.61 (May 6, 1980) [hereinafter cited as I1 N.R.C.]. See also Foreign Assirtance and Related
Agencies Appropriationsfor 1979: Hearings Before a Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and
Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978)
(statement of Mr. Nosenzo) [hereinafter cited as Cong. Hearings]. The NRC staff review
revealed many serious concerns of safety, to be discussed below.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
18. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1351.
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site. 19
Construction at the site proceeded, but Westinghouse's application

seeking authorization to export required components was deferred by
the NRC, despite executive branch recommendation, pending final de-

termination of the facility license."0 On September 28, 1979, the executive branch submitted to the NRC the recommendation that the license

for the facility export be granted. On May 6, 1980, after public hearings,2 the Commission authorized the issuance of licenses for the export of a nuclear reactor and certain components to the Philippines.2
The Commission also denied requests to stay its orders pending judicial review.3
B.

Safety
The site of the proposed 620 megawatt nuclear power plant is on

the flank of Mt. Natib, a volcano considered still active. The mudflow
from the last eruption stopped only two miles from this site.24 In addi-

tion, three other active volcanoes are less than ninety miles away and
any eruption may threaten the nuclear plant with ash, lava flow, or a

volcanic earthquake.'

The Philippines are also known for the signifi-

cant number of earthquakes that rock the archipelago, which is located

in what is considered one of the earth's most seismically active re19. Id. There were also allegations of contractual irregularities on the part of the Philippine government. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 632 nA.
20. 11 N.R.C., upra note 16, at 633.
21. The orders of the Commission for public hearings were reprinted at 44 Fed. Reg.
61475-6 (Oct. 25, 1979) and 45 Fed. Reg. 10099 (Feb. 14, 1980).
22. The NRC issued two orders on May 6, 1980. The first authorized issuance of
licenses to export to the Philippines a nuclear reactor and certain components. This order
was based on a finding that all applicable licensing criteria had been met. 11 N.R.C. at 63 1.
The second order was a declaration by the Commission that it would consider only the
health, safety, and environmental impacts that affect the territory of the United States or the
global commons. Id. at 672. Seegeneraly In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Export to South
Korea), 12 N.R.C. 253 (1980) for an interpretation by the Commission of the May 6 orders.
23. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 631.
24. Memorandum from W.P. Gammill, Assistant Director for Site Technology, NRC,
dated March 9, 1977, to FJ. Miraglia, N.R.C. A/R Vol. 12, Doc. 1,citedin Petitioner's Brief
at 10, nA.
25. Cong. Hearings, supra note 16, at 49, citing O'Toole, Nuclear Plant Loan Challenged, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1978. See also Petitioner's Brief at 10. An IAEA expert mission
in 1978 concluded that the Philippine site (PNPP-1) is "unique to the industry insofar as the
risk associated with nearby volcanoes is concerned" and that the "eruption of Mt. Natib is a
credible event which should be taken into account in design." Report of the IAEA Safety
Mission for a Review of Certain Geological and Geotechnical Aspects of the Site and its
Environment for the PNPP-1, at 7 N.R.C. A/R voL 12, Do. No. 11 (July 1978) [hereinafter
cited as IAEA Mission Report], cited in NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1370 n.14.
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gions.26 The 1978 IAEA report suggested that further study of the potential hazards from earthquakes was needed.27
The selected site known as PNPP-1 poses additional safety con-

cerns. Within twelve miles of PNPP-1 is the Subic Bay Naval Base.
Clark Air Force Base is forty miles away. A total of 32,000 United
States citizens are stationed on these bases,28 and large quantities of
fuel and weaponry are stored at these sites. 29 The city of Manila, with

millions of residents, is only forty-five miles away.
In addition to questions which have been raised about the safety of
the site, the safety of the reactor's design has also been challenged. No
reactor of similar design has ever been licensed by the NRC, nor even
subjected to rigorous review. 30 The adequacy of the design was questioned by an IAEA expert in 1977.11 Following the Three Mile Island

nuclear reactor accident, President Marcos of the Philippines ordered
suspension of work on PNPP-1 and established the Puno Commission
to conduct an inquiry into the safety of the nuclear plant.32 The Puno
Commission's report suggested modification of the Westinghouse contract to enhance safety, stating that the plant as designed was not safe,
being based on an old design plagued with unresolved safety
problems.33
Management of the waste produced by PNPP-1 is a third area of
26. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1370.
27. Id. at n.15.
28. Id. at 1351.
29. Cong. Hearings,supra note 16, at 49, referring to Wash. Post article, supra note 25,
Baltimore Gas & Electric was refused permission to build a reactor at Perryman, Maryland,
at least in part because it was too close to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, an Army installation,
30. Cong. Hearings, supra note 16, at 72. Commissioner Bradford, in his dissent from
the Commission's order, quoted the history of the PNPP-I design as offered by the peti.
tioner, the NRDC. According to the NRDC, the design was referenced to a plant under
construction in Yugoslavia since 1974, which was referenced to a Brazilian plant, referenced
in turn to a plant in Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican plant was never built or licensed by the
NRC. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 668 n.5.
The State Department asserted that PNPP-I is an updated version of three plants built
in the United States which became operational between 1972-74. The NRDC alleged that
"it is highly unlikely that any of these plants could be licensed to operate today without
substantial modification." I1 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 668 n.5. Commissioner Bradford
stated that this history of the plant's design would "if verified, seem to compel a more extensive review." Id. Nevertheless, the Commission declined to review the design of PNPP-I.
Id. at 648.
31. Rosen, "The Critical Issue of Nuclear Power Plant Safety in Developing Countries," IAE4 Bulletin (Apr. 1977).
32. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1383 n.133. The Puno Commission was named
after its chairman.
33. Id. President Marcos announced that the project would be cancelled absent fundamental changes and contract renegotiations. Id.
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concern. The Philippine government recognized that the seismic activity and lack of stable rock or salt formations within the archipelago
would force the nation to ship its nuclear wastes elsewhere, with the
inherent hazards of transportation. 4
The NRC, in its export license application proceedings, and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in its judicial review of the
agency's action, were presented with these safety concerns. The attention given these issues was determined by the interpretation of two statutes by the agency and the court.
III.

THE STATUTES

The export of nuclear materials must meet the criteria of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)3 5 as amended by the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).3 6 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)3 7 sets independent requirements for any major federal
action with significant effects on the quality of the human environment.
These two statutes are directed at different targets and goals which occasionally may be contradictory. In its analysis of the Philippine export license, the court reconciled the statutes by giving NEPA
secondary import.
The remainder of this Note will examine the statutory language
and legislative history of the AEA and the NNPA and analyze the
court's interpretation of the nuclear export licensing scheme. A discussion of NEPA will follow, with special emphasis upon the legislative
history and judicial decisions concerning the international reach of the
statute.
A. The Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
1. The Language of the Act
Section 103(d) of the AEA precludes the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission from issuing an export license "if, in the opinion of the
Commission, the issuance of a license. . . would be inimical to the
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. ''3 Prior to the enactment of the NNPA amendment, this provision
34. Petitioner's Briefat 13, n.3, Ibe and Aleta, "Prospects & Problems of Nuclear Power
in the Philippines" 6, N.R.C. A/R vol 12, Doc. No. 14 (paper presented to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, May 2-3, 1977).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
36. 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (codified in various sections of Titles 22 and 42 of U.S.C.).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1973).
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was the only licensing standard the NRC was required to consider. 39

Following the detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974,40 the
United States government began an intensive reassessment of its nuclear export policies.4 1 The result was passage of the Nuclear NonProliferation Act in 1978, the purpose of which was
to establish new and more rigorous criteria and procedures to govern
the exports of nuclear materials and technology by the United States
... . The approach to the legislation [was] to provide both incentives for foreign nations to conform to comprehensive antiproliferation safeguards, and deterrents to attainment of technologies and
materials which would enable other nations to produce nuclear explosives in a short time.42

The NNPA was thus designed to make United States licensing more
reliable and predictable, encouraging nations to look to the United
States as the preferred source of nuclear materials, while providing
safeguards against nuclear weapons proliferation. United States firms
would reap the benefits of sales, while recipient nations accepted the
United States terms of nonproliferation.43 To attract foreign buyers,
the export procedure was streamlined and made specific, and time
guidelines were established. Sections 127 and 128 of the NNPA detail
the criteria which the Commission must consider prior to issuing an
export license."

These factors include the application of IAEA safe-

guards, preclusion of the use of United States materials for nuclear explosive or military purposes, adequate physical security, United States
control rights on retransfers and reprocessing, and a general prohibition on exportation unless all facilities or materials under the jurisdic39. The AEA of 1954, as amended, provides for a two tier structure for control of nuclear technology. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). An Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and the recipient nation is required, and each transfer
of nuclear materials or facilities must receive an export license from the Atomic Energy
Commission. Each Agreement for Cooperation must be approved by the President with a
determination that it "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." 42 U.S.C. § 2153(b) (Supp. III 1979). Since 1974, Congress has
had the power to block, by concurrent resolution, any agreement authorizing export of a
reactor of more than five thermal megawatts. 42 U.S,C. § 2153(d) (Supp. III 1979). NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 378.
40. India detonated a nuclear explosion below the surface of the Rajasthan Desert on
May 18, 1974, accomplished with "peaceful" nuclear materials. Krauland, NEP4, Nukes
and Non-Proliferation: Clarifying the TransnationalImpact Statement Mandate in Nuclear
Export Licensing, 4 HASTINGS INT'L AND CoMP. L. REv. 201, 237 n.121 (1981).
41. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1372.
42. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
43. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1373.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156, 2157 (Supp. III 1979).
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tion of the recipient nation meet the above criteria.45
In enacting the NNPA with these prerequisites, Congress did not
repeal the AEA. The House Committee Report made it clear that the
NNPA criteria were "in addition to any others required by law" and
"[tihus, for example, NRC would continue to make the finding, where
applicable, that a particular export would not be 'inimical to the common defense and security.' "" The Commission would normally not
have to look beyond the criteria of the NNPA, for the House Committee stated that, "in the absence of unusual circumstances, the committee
believes that any proposed export meeting the criteria set forth in subsection 127 a. and.

. .

subsection 128 a. would also satisfy the common

defense and security standard."'4 7 "Unusual circumstances" is a problematic term and shall be discussed in reference to the Philippines
below.
In neither the AEA nor the NNPA are there specific environmental guidelines. Following extensive debate on the Senate floor,48 a compromise amendment to the NNPA was added. The compromise
consisted of an expression of concern for environmental protection, yet
purposefully was not intended to affect any decision on the reach of the
National Environmental Policy Act upon nuclear exports.4 9 The compromise amendment calls on the President to "endeavor to provide" in
any new or modified agreement "for cooperation between the parties in
protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or
thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities."50 The
question of whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required before a nuclear export license may be issued is thus an independent issue.5
Under the separate statutory scheme of
AEA/NNPA, the NRC must consider whether the NNPA criteria are
met and, if unusual circumstances are present, whether there is any
threat to the common defense and security.
45. Id. See also House REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23.
46. House REPORT, supra note 4, at 21.
47. Id. The term "unusual circumstances" is discussed infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
48. See 124 CONG. REc. S1449-54 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (debate on S.897). See also
id. at S1069, S1079-83 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978). Citedin 647 F.2d at 1361.
49. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1361. See 124 CONG. REc. S1449-50 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Glenn and Sen. McClure).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(e) (Supp. I 1978).
51. See infra notes 160-209 and accompanying text.
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2. The Procedure
The application review procedure contained in section 126 of the
NNPA52 directs the involvement of both the NRC and the executive
branch in the decision making. This scheme establishes an independent role for the Commission in the review.
The process of review begins with the filing of an application for
an export license with the NRC. The NRC begins its own consideration of the application and forwards a copy to the Department of State,
triggering executive branch review by the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. The executive branch sends its recommendation to the NRC,
which must then act within sixty days, absent an explained delay. Sixty
days later, if the Commission has not yet acted, the President may withdraw the application from the NRC and authorize the export through
an executive order, if "futher delay would be excessive" and "withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security."' 3 If the NRC denies the
license, the Commission may refer the application to the President,
who may then rule on it subject to no time restraint. Congress may
review either a Presidential withdrawal or referral and may block an
executive authorization through a concurrent resolution of disapproval
within sixty days.54
Under the statutory framework, therefore, the NRC must conduct
an independent review of the license application. The legislative history of the NNPA clearly shows the intent to impose this legal obligation upon the NRC.55 Senator Charles Percy, one of the principal
sponsors of the NNPA, stated, "there is no question that the NRC
should have full access to all information available to the executive
branch.

. .

and that the NRC, in making the findings and judgments

under this act, should independently assess the information which is
available to it." 56 Senator John Glenn, another of the bill's sponsors,
reiterated this role of the NRC when he successfully opposed amend52. 42 U.S.C. § 2155 (Supp. 11 1978).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(2) (Supp. II 1978). See Exec. Order No. 12055, 43 Fed. Reg.
18157 (1978) and Exec. Order No. 12218, 45 Fed. Reg. 41625 (1980).
54. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1349. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-15.
55. "The committee [House Comm. on Int'l. Relations] is also particularly committed to
having the NRC continue to provide independent assessment and validation of decisions to
enter into subsequent arrangements." HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
56. 124 CONG. REC. S1429-1468 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
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ments that would "constrain the NRC from performing the role we
have given it as an independent check on the judgments of the executive branch."5 7 Even the State Department has recognized the independent function of the NRC, stating that "the Executive Branch
the Commission to rubber-stamping
does not propose to. . .relegate
58
license recommendations.1
3.

The Application: An Analysis of NRDC v. NRC

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
NRC decision to grant Westinghouse a license to export a 620 megawatt commercial nuclear reactor to the Philippines. 59 Two judges
wrote opinions upholding the administrative decision, yet differed dramatically in their rationales. 6° Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey found the
Commission's action to be in full compliance with statutory requirements, and proper material for a judicial review.61 Judge Spottswood
W. Robinson questioned the validity of the NRC's action, 62yet upheld it
by adopting an extremely deferential standard of review.
a. Common Defense and Security

The first question the NRC must address when considering a nu57. 124 CONG. Rac. S1310-1342 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Glenn).
58. 124 CONG. REc. S1310-1342 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978). Letter from Joseph S. Nye,
Deputy to the Undersecretary of State, to the Hon. Frank Church, Feb. 4, 1978.
59. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3.
60. The third judge, Judge Ginsburg, recused herself after oral arguments. D.C. Circuit
Upholds Nuclear Export to Philppines,Disides on Question ofNEPA "sInternationalReach,
11 E.L.R. 10078 (Mar.-Apr. 1981).
61. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1358-59. The applicable judicial standard of review of administrative agency actions is a complex, much debated issue.
Judge Wilkey deemed the issues in the instant case to be questions of law and therefore
"necessaril, decided by judicial construction of the two statutes." Id. at 1359 n.63 (emphasis
in original). Consequently, he rejected the standards of "arbitrary and capricious" and
"substantial evidence" as irrelevant, as the issues turned on the legal basis rather than the
factual underpinning of the agency's action. Id. at 1359.
Judge Wilkey's hesitancy to apply a stricter standard of review prompted his dissent in
a more recent case, NRDC v. United States NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1982). An
interesting debate of the standards ofjudicial review is conducted in this case between Judge
Wilkey and Senior Circuit Judge Bazelon. Judge Wilkey concludes that Judge Bazelon applied a standard best described as "too hard a look," in contradiction of the Supreme Court's
mandate in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 685 F.2d
at 517. The debate continues but is beyond the scope of this Note to fully analyze.
62. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 370-71. Judge Robinson did not address or even
cite the Administrative Procedure Act and its standards of judicial review as Judge Wilkey
had done. Judge Robinson adopted a standard of great deference to an interpretation of a
statute by the agency entrusted with its administration, which should be followed by the
court "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong . . . ' Id.
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clear export license application is whether the export would be "inimical to the common defense and security. ' 63 At issue in NRDC v.NRC
was whether this required the NRC to look to impacts occurring in the
foreign environment in addition to those in the territorial United States
and the global commons.
Absent unusual circumstances, a finding of compliance with subsections 127 and 128 criteria is sufficient to permit issuance of a license.' Judge Wilkey held that, as a matter of law, the presence of
32,000 United States military personnel, seismic activity, United States
tourists and business interests, and dormant volcanoes does not constitute unusual circumstances with regard to United States common defense and security." Thus, there was no need to examine foreign
impacts. Judge Robinson found this conclusion "strange," as this was
"the first reactor to be built near American military bases in one of the
most seismically dangerous regions on earth. 66 Nonetheless, Robinson, as was so often the case in his opinion, chose to defer to the NRC's
decision on this point.67 While refusing to find that unusual circumstances were absent as a matter of law, he ruled that the NRC has "primary authority to determine what constitutes unusual
circumstances. ' 6 He stated that the court should not "intrude
unnec69
essarily" into the business of licensing nuclear exports.
Since neither the judges nor the Commission found unusual circumstances present, only the six criteria of NNPA70 were applicable in
determining the appropriateness of the export license. The Commission found that the Philippine Government had given the United States
adequate assurance that all conditions would be met.7" The Philippines is a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and thus has agreed to terms which are similar to many of the
NNPA standards.72 The agreement for cooperation 73 provides for all
63. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
64. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
65. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1363.
66. Id. at 1382.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
71. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 653.
72. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1978, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839. The Philippines deposited its instrument of ratification to the treaty on
October 5, 1972. Terms of the NPT include the implementation of IAEA safeguards and the
promise not to develop nuclear explosives. The potential weaknesses of dependence on the
NPT and IAEA safeguards have been raised in recent Senate hearings. See IAEA Programs
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the other requirements of the NNPA. Thus, a finding of no unusual

circumstances almost guaranteed, without further analysis, a finding of
no inimicality to the common defense and security.
The implications of a shallow review are several. One possible
repercussion of a defective export would be damage to the United

States reputation as a reliable supplier of nuclear technology. A reputation of dependability is one of the goals of the NNPA.

4

Ambassador

Sullivan, United States Ambassador to the Philippines, was aware of
this potential harm to the United States image. He stated, "The Embassy considered a great deal of American prestige [to be] riding on
Westinghouse performance, and. . therefore we intended to follow

the project closely. I pointed out that this was in effect the Filipino
Aswan Dam, being the largest and most expensive construction ever
undertaken in this country."" 5 Senator Claiborne Pell alerted the NRC

of this danger, writing:
The voice of many countries would quickly shift to criticism of the
United States for permitting a dangerous export with insufficient attention to the risks to public health and safety and to the environment ....
Such reaction would exacerbate US foreign relations
and might well be seized upon by hostile nations in an effort to embarrass and 7discredit
this country and thereby to weaken our influ6
ence abroad.
of Safeguards: Hearingsbefore the CommL on Foreign Relations ofthe Senate, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1981) (Statement of Sen. Gary Hart). Senator Hart questioned the efficacy of
inspections announced in advance, subject to personnel approval by the host country. Furthermore, a country may sign the NPT, receive the technology and assistance, and withdraw
from the treaty on 90 days notice. Senator Hart urged suspension of all exports until the
United States was confident that diversion could be detected. The ability of the IAEA safeguards system to detect a diversion of nuclear materials in some types of facilities was questioned by Nunzio Palladino of the NRC in a letter to Larry Pressler, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Arms Control, Oceans & Int'l Environment, Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations.
73. See supra note 6. The agreement gave the United States control rights over transfers and reprocessing of special nuclear materials produced through the United States-supplied reactor. Id. Arts. XI(3), IX(H), IX(F).
74. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
75. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1381 (citing cable from United States Embassy
Manila (11,505) to Department of State, Sept. 25, 1974). The ecological problems created by
the construction of the Aswan Dam, in which the United States was not involved, included
the creation of serious health problems, the decimation of an important fishery at the mouth
of the Nile, and severe problems for farmers who had previously relied on the flooding of
the Nile. See Adna. of NEP4 1972: HearingsBefore the Subcomra on Fheriesand Wildlife
Conservationof the House Comr. on MerchantAfarines and Fisheries,92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Adm. of NEPA 1972].
76. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1378 (citing letter of Sen. Claiborne Pell to the
NRC, Nov. 9, 1979). See also Brief for Petitioners at 33, n. 1. Representative Clarence Long
made a similar point, saying that "the political cost to the U.S. of any major disaster or
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Thus, the export of only high quality, safe nuclear equipment is essential to the maintenance of the United States reputation as a supplier
and to the fulfillment of the stated NNPA objectives 7 7 United States
security, in this scenario, is dependent upon the exports of private
firms--exports which appear to have received United States governmental approval.7 8
In addition to harming the United States reputation, a second potential threat to security and defense exists. An accident at PNPP-1
could cripple the two United States military bases that are within forty
miles of the site. These bases house 32,000 United States military personnel, millions of gallons of diesel oil and jet fuel, and large deposits
of ammunition, as well as warplanes and ships.79 A joint communiqu6
of the Philippine and United States governments in 1975 stressed the
vital role of these bases, stating that the continued vitality of the bases
remains "important in maintaining an effective United States presence
in the Western Pacific." 80
Despite the potential danger to the common defense and security,
the NRC refused to assess the export in relation to these risks, relying
on the executive branch to consider these impacts within the content of
an assessment pursuant to Executive Order 12114.1
Judge Wilkey supported the NRC in its refusal to examine impacts on United States interests in the Philippines, chiefly on the basis
of deference to the executive. He feared that NRC consideration of
these effects could "inhibit the conduct of United States foreign relations"8 2 and "conceivably might mire nuclear export licensing in plain
expedition and
contravention of the NNPA objectives:
predictability." 3
breakdown would be far worse than just prestige." Statement of Hon. Clarence D. Long
before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade of the Foreign Affairs Comm.,
Dec. 18, 1979.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
78. Cong.Hearings,supra note 16, at 102. Rep. Long read into the record a statement
from the International Program Division of the NRC: "Of great concern to us is the fact
that a review of this type may carry with it implied responsibility on the part of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission."
79. Cong. Hearings,supra note 16, at 50 (citing Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1978).
80. Ford/Marcos Joint Communiqu6 2, Dec. 7, 1975. The Reagan administration has
also acknowledged the importance of the Philippine bases to United States security. See
U.S. Policy Toward the Philopines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific
Affairs and on Human Rights & Int'l. Organizationsofthe House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 57 (Nov. 18, 1981) (comment of Rep. Solarz).
81. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 655. See also infra note 86.
82. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1358.
83. Id. at 1363.

1983]

Exporting Nuclear Materials

By focusing on these objectives, Wilkey's analysis ignored the
stated goal of the regulatory scheme to ensure "effective controls by the
United States over its exports of nuclear materials and equipment and
of nuclear technology"8 4 and overlooked the expressed legislative desire for an independent review conducted by the NRC.85 The only
technical evaluation was in the form of the Concise Environmental Review done by the Department of State pursuant to Executive Order
1211486 which was not as extensive as an EIS would have been.8 7
Yet, the reports made by the executive branch, especially the President and Departments of State and Defense, on matters of national

security are entitled to deference, 88 for, as Wilkey ruled, "it would be
presumptious [sic] for the Commission to weigh the safety of the Philippines and the soldiers there on a 'common defense and security' scale
without expert sensitivity to foreign policy repercussions."8 9

Judge Robinson recognized the risk an accident at PNPP-l would
pose to United States foreign policy interests. "Perhaps most significantly, the reputation of this country as a dependable supplier of nuclear technology could be harmed irreparably."' s
Nevertheless,
Robinson also deferred to the NRC determination that it need not look

at impacts on United States interests abroad. Although he found both
the statutory language and legislative history cryptic and felt that perhaps more is required of the NRC, he was unable to perceive any corn84. 22 U.S.C. § 3202(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
85. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
86. Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979). requires executive branch agencies to assess environmental impacts occurring abroad due to major federal actions. The
NRC export licensing decisions are specifically exempted from this order by section 2-5(v).
NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1378 n.83. Thus, Executive Order No. 12114 applied only
to the executive branch recommendation to the Commission.
87. Commissioner Bradford of the NRC, dissenting from the Commission's opinion.
felt that the AEA/NNPA criteria required as detailed a review as could reasonably be made.
This void is not filled by the environmental assessment prepared by the Departments of State and Defense with the assistance of the Department of Energy.
That document is little more than a description of the reactor. The Department of
Energy was strongly criticial [sic] of it, and it does not address the possible consequences of a severe accident beyond saying that they would be similar to those to
be expected in the U.S. This statement ignores local conditions which are essential
to evaluating impacts. In any case, the Commission has declined to consider this
document even though the Departments of State and Defense actually suggested
an NRC review of the volcanic and seismic risks posed by the reactor to the military bases and thus to the common defense and security.
11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 669 n.6.
88. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1364.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1382.
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pelling indication that the Commission was wrong. "For this reason
and this reason alone," Robinson affirmed the NRC on this point."
Judge Robinson, however, took exception to the NRC's refusal to
independently assess the potential impacts of the export, saying, "There
is something that strikes me as inherently wrong where, as here, the
only extensive technical evaluation of critical nuclear reactor components is undertaken by the State Department rather than NRC."9 2
The framework for independent review established by Congress in
the NNPA was ignored by the Commission and the court by giving
such deference to the executive branch. There are foreign policy repercussions involved with all export decisions, and the executive is un93
doubtedly the branch constitutionally directed to address these issues.
The NRC, however, is not mandated to consider all implications of its
decisions but only those specified in AEA/NNPA. When determining
whether the common defense and security is threatened by an export in
question, the Commission should be able to rely upon the executive
conducting a contemporaneous investigation to determine the effects
on foreign relations. The NRC should investigate other technical and
practical issues such as the effects upon nearby United States military
installations. To do otherwise is to ignore the clear congressional intent
that simultaneous and independent recommendations from both the
NRC and the executive branch be considered.
b. Health and Safety
In addition to finding that the export would not be inimical to the
common defense and security,9 4 the NRC must also determine that the
export would not be inimical to the health and safety of the public. 5
What constitutes the public, however, is unclear. The NRC interpreted
the phrase to obligate only a consideration of the effects on the American public within the United States. 96 In the Commission's view,
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1378.
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3. Congress is given the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations in article I, § 8. Congressional delegation to the President of regulatory
authority over foreign exports has been upheld on several ocassions. See United States v.
Brumage, 377 F. Supp. 144, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965);
United States v. Rosenberg, 150 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 752
(1945).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 38-47, 63,
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that
this was required of the NRC. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1349-51. Contra Krauland,
supra note 40.
96. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1364. NRC regulations state that "'public health
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neither the United States citizens stationed near the PNPP-1 site nor

the local Filipinos are part of the public for purposes of the export
review.9 7

1) Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
A traditional principle of international law holds that federal statutes are presumed to apply only to conduct within the United States
unless a contrary congressional intent is clear.98 The Commission and
Judge Wilkey concluded that there was no clear intent displayed in the

legislative history of the NNPA to require an examination of the adverse impacts occurring within the Philippines.9 9

Judge Robinson's interpretation of international law emphasized
the precedence to be given domestic law, pointing out that "under the
American system tenets of international law must give way before positive domestic law."'100 Thus, while statutes are to be interpreted as con-

sistent with international law where possible, a positive statutory law of
this country is to take precedence in the face of any conflict.
In light of these principles, the court considered whether an exami-

nation of possible adverse effects within the recipient nation would
constitute an extraterritorial application of law.
Wilkey agreed with the amicus brief filed on behalf of the Philippine government, finding that such an examination would infringe

upon Philippine sovereignty by displacing Philippine domestic regulation and directing the activities of a foreign government.10 1 Robinson,
and safety' means the public health and safety of the United States." 10 C.F.R. § 110.2(ii)
(1982). This definition still fails to explicitly state whether United States interests abroad are
considered part of the United States.
97. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 637.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 38 (1965) provides that "[r]ules of United States statutory law.., apply only to
conduct occurring within, or having effect within the territory of the United States, unless
the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-GobainPont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949).
99. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1357; 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 638.
100. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1377. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
708 (1900); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1960). Judge Wilkey acknowledged this rule, stating that if "a statute directs an agency of
the United States to consider foreign environmental impacts no court of the United States
will contravene the will of Congress. The only exception would be if the legislature were
wholly without jurisdiction to prescribe the relevant conduct. . . ." NRDC v. NRC, supra
note 3, at 1357.
101. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1365. Judge Wilkey stated that conditioning an
export license on standards the United States thinks sound for the foreign nation's regula-
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on the other hand, disagreed with the NRC assumption that by conducting a review of effects pursuant to the NNPA (or NEPA) it would
be applying statutes extraterritorially. The conduct to be regulated by
the license procedure is not extraterritorial in nature, Robinson pointed
02
out, since the licensing takes place wholly within the United States.1
Although it is obvious that the licensing procedure is domestic in
the sense that it occurs within the United States, it would be naive to
ignore the extraterritorial consequences of such action. 0 3 Yet it is difficult to imagine many United States governmental actions without extraterritorial consequences, and this alone is not enough to support a
claim that the action infringes upon a foreign sovereign.
The claim of undue infringement of sovereignty is especially weak
in relation to nuclear exports to the Philippines. In the 1968 Agreement for Cooperation, 1' 4 the Philippines explicitly agreed to provide
health and safety information and agreed to the use of site visits. The
Concise Environmental Impact Review10 5 conducted by the executive
branch was not deemed an invasion of sovereignty. In fact, the Philippine government asked the NRC to review the site report prepared by
the engineering firm.'0

6

When the large role the United States govern-

ment has played in this export is reviewed, t0 7 making it obvious that
this was not merely a private firm exporting its manufactured goods, it
seems too late to suddenly decide, as Judge Wilkey did, that "foreign
impacts.

. .

are basically someone else's problem.''l 8

It will be the responsibility of the Philippine government to operate the plant, and the NRC will not have continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the project once the license is issued and the materials
shipped." Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference" t0 declared that
tion would direct that nation's choice as effectively as a law explicitly directing foreign behavior. Id. at 1357.
102. Id. at 1377.
103. Id. at 1357.
104. See supra note 6.
105. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
106. Cong. Hearings, supra note 16, at 102. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 5-6, 14-16 and accompanying text. The United States played a
"crucial role" in the view of the Philippine government. Amicus Brief of the Philippine
Government at 8.
108. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1365 n.105.
109. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 648.
110. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21 (1972). REPORT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT at 2-65,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, reprintedin 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 105, 118 (1972). This declaration
has no binding effect on United States courts.
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states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not damage the environment of others. The NRC, and the
court in upholding the Commission's decision, seem to have confused
the right and the responsibility.
2)

Effects on the Public Within the United States

Having found no clear congressional intent to override the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the NNPA, Judge
Wilkey upheld the NRC decision that the American public within the
United States is the only public which is relevant to the finding of noninimicality. He found that "on balance the Philippines sovereignty interest may prevail over and displace the NRC administrative
interest."II
Judge Robinson, while affirming the NRC analysis of the effects
on the territorial United States, 1 2 questioned the methodology employed by the Commission. The potential hazards to the United States
Pacific Territories in the event of an accident and the problem of waste
management were both dismissed by the NRC, leading Robinson to
label the analysis "cursory at best." ' " 3 Still, he refused to overturn the
NRC on this point, but admitted he would have "serious reservations
were the reactor not so far removed from this country and relatively
distant from any of its territories or possessions." 't 4 Robinson warned
that the "NRC will be well advised to take this obligation seriously." '" 5
3)

Effects on Global Commons

The effect of a nuclear export upon the global commons was, in
the opinion of the NRC, the only other area where the inimicality standard was applicable, and a review of these effects was considered to be
a matter within the agency's discretion." 16 Since the United States is "a
major user of the global commons," the Commission chose to exercise
111. NRDC v. NRC, sufpra note 3, at 1364-65 (emphasis in original).
112. Id.at 1379.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1379 n.89. The petitioners did not quarrel with the NRC conclusion concerning effects on the territorial United States, yet they did point out the weaknesses of relying
on generic impact analysis. See supra note 93 and infra notes 119-126 and accompanying
text.
116. 11 N.R.C., upra note 16, at 651. But see Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332 1337
(1977), where the Commission ruled that global commons effects must be fully evaluated.
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this discretion, although in a limited manner.'"7 The global commons
consist of the areas over which no nation claims jurisdiction: the high
seas, the upper atmosphere, and Antarctica."" The Commission, in its
analysis of the effects on the global commons relied upon three generic
reports" 9 and on this basis concluded that the risk to the global commons is negligible if indeed a risk exists at all.12 0 Judge Wilkey ac-

cepted this NRC conclusion with little discussion, finding reliance on
generic studies, extrapolations from domestic
situations, and executive
2
reports to be sufficient absent site visits.' '
Judge Robinson was "troubled by NRC's willingness to predicate
its determination on generic documents alone,"12 2 especially since there
are special circumstances surrounding the PNPP-1 site.' 23 Nevertheless, Robinson deferred to the NRC's expertise, stating that courts may
probe the exercise of the agency's technical preeminence only under the
abuse of discretion standard.

4

The judge warned the Commission,

however, that it may push beyond reasonable limits if it relies too heavily upon aging generic
materials, at which point a court may find an
25
abuse of discretion.1
The Commission's analysis of the effects on the global commons,
accomplished through reliance on generic data, is dubious at best. The
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) found the report of the Energy Research and Development Administration to be outdated and
117. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 651-52.
118. Id. at 636 n.15. As there is no international consensus on the definition of territorial
seas, the Commission chose to use a 12-mile zone as the boundary of the Philippines' territory. Id.
119. A generic report does not examine any site-specific details. The report most heavily
relied on by the NRC, Westinghouse, EBASCO, the Philippine government, and the Department of State was the Final Environmental Statement on United States Nuclear Power
Export Activities prepared in 1976 by the Energy Research and Development Administration (now the Department of Energy). This report, referred to as ERDA-1542, resulted from
the settlement of a lawsuit. See Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 E.L.R. 20685 (D.D.C. 1975). The
report is a generic analysis of the nuclear export program's expected impact on United States
territory and the global commons through the year 2000. Environmental, social, technological, economic, national security, and foreign policy benefits and costs are examined, The
other two reports the Commission relied on were The Final Environmental Statement Related to Manufacture of Floating Nuclear Power Plants by Offshore Power Systems,
NUREG-0502 (Dec. 1978) and Liquid Pathway Generic Study, NUREG-0440 (Feb. 1978).
11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 657-59.
120. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 659.
121. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1352.
122. Id. at 1383.
123. Id. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 1383 n.134.
125. Id. at 1383-84.
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inadequate. 2 6 In analyzing the effects on the global commons, the
NRC dismissed the problem of waste disposal, deferring the question
on the grounds that it need not be decided now. 27 This kind of thinking, which shows a refusal to meet the duty of long-range planning, had
been repudiated by previous courts.' 2 8 The future impact on the global
commons is not merely speculative, particularly with respect to the
Philippines export. Due to its unstable geological foundation, 29 it is
quite likely that the Philippines will be unable to store much spent nuclear fuel and consequently will ship the waste to the United States or
to an international repository.130 This direct impact on the global commons and possibly on United States territory should be analyzed while
the United States can still influence the decision.' 3 ' The deferral of
responsible decision-making is deceptive. By refusing to decide, the
Commission in fact determined the United States response to the
wastes of the Westinghouse export. If the Philippines ship the wastes to
an international repository, the United States will not be able to demand that the foreign government consider the effects on the global
commons.' 32 If such a shipment is not a viable choice,133 it is implicit
in the Commission's decision that the United States would accept and
34
store the Filipino wastes.'
126. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 658. CEQ asserted that whatever value ERDA-1542
may have had in 1976, it is insufficient in considering the environmental effects of PNPP-l.
Only a small part of the report related to the global commons. Id.
127. Id. at 659-60. This attitude should be compared to the concern expressed over the
question of waste disposal by other nations. Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have declared a moratorium on the construction and operation of new nuclear
plants pending proof of a safe and permanent disposal plan. Spivak, How,Europe hardles
Nuclear Wastes, Wall St. J., June 19, 1979, at 20, col. 4 (S.W. ed.). The NRC need not
determine that high level radioactive wastes can be permanently disposed of before granting
an operating license. NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978).
128. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (1976), rev'don othergrounds; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
129. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
130. The Commission believed the wastes of PNPP-I could be stored on-site for approximately 10 years. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 660.
131. The Commissioners recognized the possibility that the spent fuel may be returned to
the United States or stored on United States territory, but held that since it would be several
years before any spent fuel was generated, the United States government would have ample
time to assess the impacts. Id.
132. The Commission stated that if United States territory were used for such a venture,
an Environmental Impact Statement would be prepared. ld. One must question, however,
how detailed an analysis would be required, in light of the NRC's reluctance to risk imposition on foreign sovereignty.
133. There are presently no international repositories in the Pacific. Id.
134. In 1977, President Carter announced a policy under which the United States would
accept title and store foreign spent fuel, when to do so would further nonproliferation goas.
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4) Effects on United States Interests Abroad
In determining whether the proposed export would have any impact upon the health and safety of the public, the NRC decided it was a
matter of agency discretion to examine the effects upon United States
interests abroad. The Commission then declined to exercise its discretion to review the impact on the United States military personnel stationed near the site, or upon United States citizens travelling in the
area. "35
' In reaching this decision, the Commission considered a statement from the Senate Report on the NNPA, which warned "it should
be recognized that certain overseas activities could pose a threat to
Americans."' 36 The NRC interpreted the word "overseas" to mean activities in Mexico or Canada near the United States border, in which
case the United States must consider the impacts on United States citizens and territory. The Commission, however, failed to explain what
"sea" these nations are "over."' 137 Furthermore, the issue of intrusion
upon national sovereignty would still be present. 38 The Commissioners acknowledged that the Senate Report could be read as a direction
from the drafters that all potential hazards to the health and safety of
United States citizens be examined, but refused to accept this
39
interpretation. 1
The extent to which the NRC must concern itself with United
States citizens abroad was dealt with differently by the two appellate
jurists. Judge Wilkey accepted the argument presented by the Philippine government in an amicus brief which warned that "an examination of impacts on United States citizens residing in the Philippines
should not be used as a disguised way of substituting United States
regulatory standards for the Republic's own."140 His interpretation of
the principles of extraterritoriality 4 ' also inspired Judge Wilkey to acThe impacts of such a program have been studied in an EIS prepared by the United States
Department of Energy. Id.
135. Id. at 645-48. The term "U.S. interests" was defined to include military bases located abroad and large communities of United States citizens permanently residing in the
recipient nation. American tourists and foreign policy concerns were specifically excluded
from the definition. Id. at 636 n.14.
136. Id. at 646 (quoting S. Rep. No. 467, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1977)).
137. Id. at 669.
138. Id. at 671.
139. Id. at 646.
140. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1348 n.9. The amicus brief warned that if the
United States imposed standards on host countries, "such a policy would undoubtedly bode
ill for the ability of the United States to maintain military facilities in as many locations
around the world as it does now." Amicus Brief of the Philippine Government at 23,
141. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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cept the NRC's position that only threats to the health and safety of
citizens within the United States need be considered. Judge Robinson
found both the statutory language and the legislative history "cryptic,"
yet, especially in light of the Senate report warning of overseas threats,
felt more was required of the Commission. Even so, Robinson could
find no "compelling indication" that the NRC was wrong, and so de42
ferred to it.'
A reasonable limitation should be applied to the congressional directive as United States citizens can be found in nearly every nation.
While the host government is usually responsible for the safety of visiting foreigners,143 the Philippines present an unusual situation. The
32,000 United States military personnel are stationed in the Philippines
on orders of the United States government, and it is a United States
government decision to allow export of a 620 megawatt nuclear generating plant to be built close to the bases. While it may be true that
another nation might have supplied the plant if the United States had
not, 44 perhaps placing the United States personnel in an even more
precarious position, the United States government in effect appeared to
guarantee the quality of the plant by conducting an NRC review and
issuing a license. 145 An extra degree of care is due these United States
citizens who are in the proximity of PNPP-1 on governmental orders, a
higher degree than had they been tourists assuming risks of travel. As
Commissioner Bradford pointed out in his dissent from the NRC opinion, the approach adopted by the Commission leads to an assessment
of the impact of an accident on fish no closer than twelve miles, in the
46
global commons, but not on a United States citizen within ten miles. 1
5) Effects upon the Philippines
The effects of the nuclear export upon the Philippines were held by
Judge Wilkey to be an inappropriate area of consideration, constituting
an extraterritorial application of our laws. 4 7 Judge Robinson also had

no difficulty in deferring
to the NRC ruling that it was not required to
14 8
analyze these effects.

142. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1382 (emphasis in original).
143. All foreign nationals are considered "under the protection of the sovereign while
they are within his territories." 45 AM. JUR. 2D InternationalLaH, § 75 at 412 (1969).
144. It should be remembered that the United States Export-Import Bank lent or guaranteed $644.4 million for the project. See NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1351.
145. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
146. 11 N.RC., supra note 16, at 666.
147. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1363.
148. Id. at 1379.
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The legislative history on this concern is inconclusive. t49 There is
no clear congressional mandate and no legal basis to support a finding
of an invariable duty upon the NRC, indicating that it is a question
within the Commission's discretion. The presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal law supports the Commission's finding.' 50 There is, however, a countervailing argument that the United
States should recognize and honor a responsibility to ensure that any
action in which the government is involved is as safe as possible.' 5 ' As
the AEA/NNPA scheme is inconclusive on this point, the responsibility of the United States to study the impact upon the the Philippines
shall be discussed below with respect to the NEPA and its EIS
requirements.
4. The Previous Administrative Interpretations
The consistent administrative interpretation of a statute, brought
to the attention of Congress and not changed by it, has been held to be
almost conclusive evidence of congressional approval.' 52 Furthermore,
courts traditionally give deference to the interpretation of a statute by
the agency charged with its administration. 53 While Judge Robinson
heartily embraced this tradition of deference, Judge Wilkey found that
it posed questions of law and should necessarily be decided by judicial
54
construction of the two statutes.'
Prior to the enactment of the NNPA in 1978, the NRC consistently
ruled that it need not consider the health, safety, and environmental
149. Both concern for the inhabitants of recipient nations and reluctance to appear too
intrusive within the realm of another government's authority are expressed in the legislative
history. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S1450 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Glcnn);
id. at S1454 (remarks of Sen. Percy); 124 CONG. REC. S1091 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Domenici). These conflicting remarks contributed to Judge Robinson's conclusion that there was "no clear indication either way." NRDC v. NRC, suplra note 3, at
1379. The Senate Report on the NNPA, however, stated that "the NRC finding on the
health and safety of the public refers only to the American public ...
" S. Rep. No. 467,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1977).
150. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
151. Judge Robinson noted the "notion embodied in our legal tradition that a vendor is
responsible at least to some extent for the quality of its wares." While the United States is
not strictly the merchant, its approval is a part of the export requirement, NRDC v. NRC,
supra note 3, at 1379 n.92.
152. Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 646-47 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted). Congressional silence is not, however, conclusive evidence of approval. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
153. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Exxon, 616 F.2d 526 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
154. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1359 n.63.
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effects occurring in the nation receiving a United States nuclear export. 5 The Westinghouse application for a license to export to the
Philippines presents a different situation. It is the first nuclear export
licensed after the NNPA was passed, with that act's restatement of concern over safety and health. 15 6 The Philippine export is also factually
distinguishable from the agency's earlier decisions, 57 and the presence
of 32,000 United States citizens stationed within a few miles presents an
additional question of concern and responsibility to the United States
government not present in earlier decisions.
Congress did have an opportunity to direct the NRC to alter its
approach to licensing. Proposed amendments of the Export-Import
Bank Bill' 5 8 in 1978 would have required the NRC to analyze the local
effects and the regulations of the recipient nations prior to licensing the
export. The amendments were defeated, but it is uncertain whether
this was due to congressional acquiescence in the status quo or to legislative compromise.
Similarly, Congress failed to amend the AEA to include environmental concerns as part of the NNPA criteria. As a compromise measure to ensure passage, the NNPA was purposely left neutral with
respect to the environment. 59 Again, whether this demonstrates congressional acquiesence is open to question. Therefore, the previous administrative interpretations of the duty of the NRC under the NNPA to
consider impacts within the recipient nation have not been clearly approved by Congress and are not deserving of unlimited judicial
deference.
B. National Environmental Policy Act
1. The Language of the Act
The second statute of importance in a review of the adequacy of
the nuclear export licensing procedure as approved by the court of ap155. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 635-36.
156. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
157. See, eg., In the Matter of Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977). where the
dispute concerned NEPA, not the NNPA. Exports to India in Edlow International. 3
N.R.C. 563 (1976) and 5 N.R.C. 1358 (1977), involved only a few United States citizens
living closeby.
158. Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1978: HearingsBefore the Subcomm on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm on Environment and Public lVorks, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. 220 (1978).
159. Seesupra note 49 and accompanying text. 124 CONG. REC. S1449-50 (daily ed. Feb.
7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Glenn and Sen. McClure, reprintedin CRS LEGisLATivE HisoRy
OF NNPA at 725).
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peals is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.160 Two sec-

tions of NEPA are of special interest when an international action is
being considered. The first, section 102(2)(C),1 6 requires an EIS to be
fied under certain conditions. The second, section 102(2)(F), t62 re-

quires international cooperation where appropriate to protect the
environment.

Section 102(2)(C) requires an EIS to be submitted for "every major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." '63 This requirement has been interpreted to be
"extraordinarily broad, compelling consideration of any and all types
of environmental impacts of federal action. '' 64 Yet the limit of the international reach of NEPA has never been clearly defined. 6 ' The stat-

utory language could indicate a congressional intent that it have
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). This section requires:
that, to the fullest extent possible: (I) the policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official ....
162. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1976).
163. Judge Robinson believed that Judge Wilkey had assumed that issuance of the export license was a major federal action. Judge Robinson saw no reason to decide this question. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1385 n.141. The NRC concluded that the "impacts
from individual fuel shipments or component shipments are generally de minlm~ls and. . ,
not 'major federal actions.'" Id. at 1384 (citing Commission's decision), II N.R.C., stra
note 16, at 672. The petitioners argued that "[s]ince the environmental impact of a nuclear
reactor is significant whether it is to be constructed in the U.S. or elsewhere, there is no
logical reason to distinguish between the licensing of an exported and a domestic facility,"
Id. at 1385. Few decisions detail criteria used to determine if an'action is major, federal,
and with significant effect, and few challenges have been dismissed due to the absence of
these factors. If the action "requires substantial planning, time, resources, or expenditure,"
it is defined as a "major federal action." NRDC v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366-67 (D.NC.
1972). For a detailed review of judicial definitions of these terms, see Yarrington, The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act, 4 ENV'T REP. (BNA) Monograph 17 (1974).
164. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir,
1971).
165. There are numerous law review articles discussing the international reach of NEPA.
See, e.g., Robinson, Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs
Agencies: The Unfu~fllledMandate ofNEPA , 7 INT'L L. & POL. 257 (1974); Yost, Anterican
GovernmentaiResponsibilityforthe EnvironmentalEffects ofActions Abroad, 43 ALt. L. Rruv.
528 (1979); Note, The ExtraterritorialScope ofNEPA 's EnvironmentalImpact Statemnent Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349 (1975). Contra Krauland, supra note 40; Almond, The
ExtraterritorialReach of United States RegulatoryAuthority Over the EnvironmentalIttpacts
of Its Activities, 44 ALB. L. REv. 739 (1980).
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international application. Words such as "human environment," "biosphere," and "man and his environment" could be said to be inherently

transnational or to be only expressions of concern for the global
commons.

On the other hand, section 102(2)(F) is clearly transnational in
scope, requiring that
to the fullest extent possible ...all agencies of the Federal government shall. . . recognize the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international
cooperation in anticipating and 166
preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind's world environment.
Whether this requirement of cooperation is in addition to or in place of

the EIS requirement is a much debated question and cannot be conclusively answered by reliance on the statutory language.
2.

The Legislative History of the Act

The legislative history, although ambiguous, arguably supports an
international application of NEPA. Many congressional sponsors and
witnesses spoke of the need to protect the global environment, recog-

nizing that impacts of major actions do not necessarily respect geopolitcal boundaries. 67 There is nothing in the congressional history to
indicate objection to transnational application, yet several members of
Congress apparently believed the protection
of the national environ68
NEPA.1
of
goal
ultimate
the
was
ment
The strongest evidence of a congressional intent that NEPA's EIS
requirement be applied internationally occurred during oversight hearings on the implementation of NEPA.

69

In response to a statement by

166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1976).
167. EnvironmentalQuality: Hearingson H.? 6750 e a. Before the Subcomnm on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm on Mferchant farine and Fheries, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. at 26-27, 44, 108-09, 109-10, 118, 130, 133, 226, 327, 425 (1969); Hearingson
S. 1075 S.237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm on Interiorand In.mlar Affairs, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. at 8, 128 (1969). Senator Jackson introduced the Senate bill by saying:
"What is involved is a congressional declaration that we do not intend, as a government or
as a people, to ... initiate actions which will do irreparable damage to the air, land, and
water which support life on earth." 115 CONG. Rac. S7815 (daily ed. July 10, 1969).
168. The Senate version of NEPA had a stated purpose of preventing adverse effects on
"the Nation's natural resources" in order to meet the needs of "present and future generations of Americans." S1075, Sec. 1, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 3698 (1969).
169. Adm. of NEPA, H.R. Rep. No. 316, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter House
Oversight Hearings]. The Supreme Court in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp., et al.v. Shell Oil
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a State Department representative that EISs were not required for environmental impacts abroad,' 0 the Committee responded that "stated
most charitably, the committee disagrees with this interpretation of
NEPA. The history of the Act makes it quite clear that the global effects of environmental decisions are inevitably a part of the decisionmaking process and must be considered in that context."'' 7
The decisions of federal agencies are inconsistent. The CEQ,
charged with the responsibility to oversee the implementation of
NEPA, t72 has uniformly held that impact statements are required for
activities with impacts within foreign nations. 173 The Departments of
State and Defense and the NRC have vigorously opposed this interpreimpact statements in
tation of NEPA, 74 but have voluntarily7 submitted
5
the past concerning foreign countries.

Co., 444 U.S. 592, 596 (1979), stated that postenactment legislative history is entitled to
significant weight, particularly when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure,
But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978).
170. House Oversight Hearings, supra note 169, at 32-33.
171. Id. at 33. In 1972, the Department of State again stated that EISs were not required
for impacts occurring in foreign jurisdictions. On this occasion, there was no protest from
the committee members. Adm. of NEPA, supra note 75, at 556, 1689-91, 1710-14, But in
1978, Sen. Muskie, a sponsor of NEPA, expressed his understanding of the original legislative intent: "Does man's environment stop at our borders? In my view, the intention of the
National Environmental Policy Act and the environmental impact statement was to apply to
major Federal actions wherever they impact within the United States or outside." ExportImport Bank Amendments of1978. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Resource Protectionof
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1978).
172. 42 U.S.C. §4344 (1977). See also Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1977)
granting CEQ authority to promulgate binding regulations on the implementation of NEPA.
The opinion of the CEQ is entitled to "substantial deference" in the courts. Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358(1979).
173. Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Applying the EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad, reprintedin 42 Fed. Reg. 61068, 61069 (1977). Accord 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.8(a)(3)(I) (1974).
174. Department of Defense regulations implementing NEPA exempt actions taken in
areas not under United States jurisdiction. 32 C.F.R. § 214.6(b)(1) (1981). In the Matter of
Babcock v. Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332, 1336-46 (1977); Edlow International, 3 N.R.C. 563, 58485 (1976).
175. See, e.g., Department of State, EIS on the Agency for International Development
Pest Management Program, No. 77-0593 (1977), and Final EIS for the New Panama Canal
Treaties-, No. 77-1549 (1977). Several other agencies have filed ElSs on foreign impacts.
including the Departments of the Navy, Commerce, Transportation, and Interior, NRDC v,
NRC, supra note 3, at 1386 n.156.
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3. The Judicial History of the Act
Judicial decisions on the reach of NEPA have also been inconclusive and all previous decisions are distinguishable from the Philippines
export.
In Wilderness Society v. Morton,1 76 Canadian nationals were allowed to intervene in federal litigation challenging the adequacy of the
Department of the Interior's compliance with NEPA for the proposed
Alaskan pipeline. Although foreign impacts were involved, an EIS was
required for the impacts on United States territory. Unlike the Philippines export, the United States was to keep substantial control of the
pipeline, further justifying an EIS.'"
In People of Enewetak v. Laird,'

Department of Defense activi-

ties on a Pacific atoll were enjoined, the court saying, "NEPA is framed
in expansive language that clearly evidences a concern for all persons
subject to federal action which has major impact on their environment." 179 The court in that case, which is easily distinguishable as it
involves a United States trust territory, explicitly did not resolve the
question of extraterritorial application of NEPA with foreign
1 80
nations.
SierraClub v. Coleman 8 involved the construction by the Department of Transportation of a highway through Colombia and Panama.
The district court ordered an EIS analyzing the impact on the local
environment, including the indigenous Indians, in addition to the potential spread of hoof and mouth disease to United States territory.
The court of appeals chose to "assume, without deciding, that NEPA is
fully applicable to construction in Panama."'8 2 This case was distinguished by Judge Wilkey from the Philippine export for two reasons. i8 3
The EIS was originally triggered by the impact on United States territory, and the United States had an ongoing financial responsibility in
the construction.
176. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
177. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1367.
178. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973)..4ccordPeople of Saipan v. United States Dep't
of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii 1973), a,'dasmod/ed, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
179. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. at 816.
180. See id. at 817 n.10.
181. 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated and remanded .ub nom. Sierra Club v.
Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (1978).
182. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d at 392 n.14. The government in this case did not
question the applicability of NEPA to the construction project in Panama.
183. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1368.
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Many other challenges to the need for an EIS were effectively
mooted through compromise, with the agencies involved agreeing to
prepare either an EIS or a less comprehensive Environmental Impact
Review." 4 The judicial precedents are therefore inconclusive, although a pattern of acknowledgement of United States responsibility
for the global commons can be discerned.
4. The Application: NRDC v. NRC
The NRC defined the "human environment" of section 102(2)(C)
to mean the United States8- and, as a matter of agency discretion, took
into account the effects on the global commons. 8 6 By evaluating the
health, safety, and environmental impact of the export on these two
spheres through the use of generic reports only, 87 the Commission
concluded that the effects were
not significant.' 8 Consequently, no
89
site-specific EIS was required.1

Fearful that requiring more would violate his concept of extraterritorial application of law, Judge Wilkey upheld this action, after distinguishing several earlier cases.' 90 He specifically limited his ruling to
NRC nuclear export licensing procedures' 9' and settled only the instant matter. The international reach of NEPA remains unmeasured.
The potential effects of a required EIS are several. The export
procedure might be delayed.' 9z Diplomatic repercussions could result,
as the Philippine government has displayed sensitivity about its appearance as an independent sovereign. 93 Even if the EIS demonstrated tremendous local environmental damage, however, the
Philippines would not necessarily be prevented from purchasing the
nuclear plant or materials. NEPA is not a part of the export licensing
184. In Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 ELR 20685 (D.D.C. 1975), the AEC agreed to provide a
worldwide, generic study of the environmental impacts of the United States nuclear exporting program. See supra notes 119, 175. See also NORML v. Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp.
1226 (D.D.C. 1978). Some EISs were agreed to because of the environmental impact on the
United States.
185. The NRC defined the United States to mean the territory of the 50 states, United
States trust territories, and possessions. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 656 n.63.
186. Id. at 656.
187. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
188. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1365.
189. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 659.
190. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1366.
191. Id. at 1366-68.
192. Id. at 1385-86.
193. Id. at 1348 n.9. The amicus brief filed by the Philippines argued that the review by
the NRC of the effects within the Philippines would be an improper substitution of United
States standards for those of the Philippines.
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procedure of AEA/NNPA, and the EIS would not be a determinative
factor in the export review. The EIS would merely let the buyer be
aware of all the potential hazards of the purchase and the United States
government would ensure the recipient of access to complete and truthful data.

NEPA is a flexible statute through which compromise is possible.
Compliance "to the fullest extent possible" is required. 194 The difficulties of a thorough foreign study canot be ignored, 195 yet this is an insufficient reason to eliminate entirely the statutory requirement of an EIS

for major federal actions with significant environmental impact. The
NRC refused to fashion an EIS from the available information, and
Judge Wilkey refused to order a compromise, stating that the question

is whether an196EIS is required at all and not whether a compromise is
appropriate.

Judge Robinson recognized that NEPA is directed to the well being of the planet, yet refused to address the question of the international reach of NEPA. Instead, he upheld the NRC on the grounds of

a statutory conflict of time, finding that the time required for an EIS
conflicts with the time schedule of AEA/NNPA. 197 The Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Act licensing procedure imposes a time schedule upon the
NRC because one of the purposes of the Act was to expedite the licens-

ing process. 198 The schedule is not so rigid as to be necessarily inconsistent with the EIS requirement of NEPA, especially in light of the

latter's flexibility. Judge Robinson found a fundamental inconsistency,
however, leading him to conclude that Congress did not intend the
NRC to conduct a thorough study of health and safety effects.

The rule of construction that Judge Robinson relied upon was ex194. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). The House and Senate conferees explained this
clause, saying that
it is the intent of the conferees that the provision 'to the fullest extent possible' shall
not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with the
directives set out in section 102. Rather, the language in section 102 is intended to
assure that all agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives
set out in said section ... and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow
construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.
H. CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
195. Site visits by NRC technical experts, an essential element of a domestic review,
would require the consent of the foreign government. A reactor may be built of parts from
other nations. The NRC would not be supervising the construction nor training the employees. A review of the design is, however, possible without site visits. 11 N.R.C., .xpra note
16, at 648.
196. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1366 n. 113.
197. Id. at 1385-86.
198. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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pressed by the Supreme Court in Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic
Rivers Association of Oklahoma.' 99 The Court held that Congress had

implicitly provided an exemption from the EIS requirement by ordering the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to process certain disclosure statements in thirty days. The Court stated that it would
not construe statutes to require acts that cannot be performed within
statutorily mandated time constraints.
The time frame established by the NNPA is not as rigid and allows for numerous extensions. The executive branch must make its
recommendation to the NRC within sixty days, unless the Secretary of
State determines more time is necessary. Upon receipt of the executive
opinion, the NRC has 120 days to make its determination, but this time
may be tolled by the institution of public proceedings. Thus, the NRC
has a minimum of 180 days to study the export effects. It is conceivable
that the Commission would have longer than this 200 if preparation of
an EIS is included in the public proceeding stage of the NRC's review
of export license applications with additional time for public comment.
The time required for a draft EIS has been estimated at three to
five months, followed by at least forty-five days for comments by agencies. In contrast, several years are usually required for an environmental review of a domestic nuclear plant.20 ' The NRC staff estimated that
at least two years would be necessary to conduct a detailed health,
safety, and environmental review in the export licensing context. 20 2
Further time may be expended for litigation over the adequacy of the
EIS.
The congressional concern with streamlining and expediting the
export licensing procedure, as evidenced by the legislative history of
the NNPA,2 0° indicates that a full-scale study was not intended. Yet
this is not to say that there is a fundamental and irreconcilable clash
between the NNPA and NEPA. Even Judge Robinson, who based his
approval of the Commission's decision on NEPA solely on this per199. 426 U.S. 776 (1976). See also Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 445 U.S. 136, 154 (1980), where the Court stated that since the Freedom of Information Act required agencies to respond to requests for information within 20 days, Congress
could not have intended to require agencies to file suit to obtain the requested information.
200. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1385. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978) directs that the NRC should start its review before receipt of the executive recommendation.
201. See ProposedNuclear Powerplant Siting and Licensing Legislation Before the Joit11
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1978) (testimony of Lee V. Gossick,
Executive Director for Operations, NRC).
202. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1386.
203. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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ceived conflict, admitted that "the statutory clash is not so evident here
as it was in FlintRidge. "24 Still, he felt "forced to agree that the period
NRC 5could count on might not be sufficient" to prepare an adequate
20
EIS.
This approach by Judge Robinson ignores the realities of the Philippines export. The executive branch took nearly three years to review
the application, 2° and the NRC took an additional seven months.
Judge Robinson felt that the NRC needs a definite schedule and should
not have to rely upon unpredictable delays. Yet, in light of the flexibility of NEPA, some compromise should be feasible. The NNPA
does not mandate a strict time schedule, and NEPA requires compliance "to the fullest extent possible.""2 7
Furthermore, Judge Robinson's reliance on the Flint Ridge doctrine dangerously expands the "statutory conflict" exemption to
NEPA.208 The realities of the situation should determine the applicability of NEPA, and an agency should not be permitted to evade environmental responsibilities by the invocation of a purely hypothetical
conflict. Only where the conflict is "clear and unavoidable" should an
exemption from NEPA requirements be allowed. 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

In upholding the NRC decision, the court of appeals left no certain signposts to follow in the next nuclear export licensing procedure.
Because Judges Wilkey and Robinson based their opinions on different
and somewhat contradictory grounds, the court failed to define the role
the NRC must play in reviewing a nuclear export license application.
Both Judges Wilkey and Robinson warned the NRC against making ad hoc decisions.2"0 This would indicate that the Commission
should follow the procedure employed in the Philippines export. Having found it to be a matter of agency discretion to inspect the impact of
the export on the Philippines, the Commissioners chose not to examine
them. Reviewing the impact on the global commons and United States
204. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1385.
205. Id. at 1386.
206. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 664 n.4.
207. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
208. 11 ELR 10078, 10081 (1981).
209. Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1976). quoting
from Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776
(1976).
210. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1359, 1384.
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interests abroad was also held to be a question of discretion. The Commissioners chose to review only the impact on the global commons.
The only mandatory review, in the opinion of the Commissioners, was
of the effects on United States citizens within United States territory.
By ruling that the presence of 32,000 United States citizens residing
within miles of the site, active volcanoes, frequent earthquakes, and
questionable design did not constitute "unusual circumstances," the
Commissioners left the phrase without meaning. It is difficult to perceive what would be unusual enough to demand a greater depth of
review by the NRC. In upholding the NRC decision and giving warnings against ad hoc decision-making, the court has apparently instructed the NRC to conduct future reviews of export license
applications as it did in the Philippines case. Future reviews will thus
probably consist only of inspections of the impact on the global commons and United States territory.
Yet, when the opinions of the court are examined, this is not a
clear mandate. Judge Wilkey held that the "statutory language and
legislative history are inconclusive" '' and neither obligate nor preclude consideration by the Commission of foreign health, safety, and
environmental impact. This is the extent of responsibility that he was
willing to assume. He went on to analyze the various findings and the
methodology employed by the NRC and upheld the Commission on
both counts. Judge Wilkey felt that the issues in the case were questions of law, and that it was up to the court to interpret the statutes. His
interpretation of the statutes, with strong reliance on the principles of
extraterritorial application of domestic law, consisted largely of deference to the agency's interpretation.
Deference to the agency was the keystone of Judge Robinson's
opinion also. Where Judge Wilkey interpreted the statutes and held
the NRC to be acting in compliance with them, Judge Robinson felt it
was not the court's duty to interpret the statutes. Judge Robinson questioned both the methodology and the results of the NRC review, yet
felt unable to overturn the agency's decision. This is especially distressing in light of his obvious doubts concerning the adequacy of review
and his acknowledgement of the importance of the subject. "Seldom if
ever has an administrative agency been assigned a mission so important to the well being and survival of mankind as that entrusted by
Congress to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 21 2 Yet, he held that
211. Id. at 1359.
212. Id. at 1368.
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"[w]hatever the wisdom and even the validity of the course NRC has
pursued, this court has little choice but to affirm it."''1 3 Since "[n]o
explicit statutory command has been disobeyed, nor any unmistakable
legislative signpost ignored, at most, NRC has made a choice among
signals-always weak and sometimes conflicting--that have emanated
from the halls of Congress. 21 4 Because of these ambiguities, Judge
Robinson concluded that he could not "be sure that NRC is right, but I
certainly cannot declare it wrong. ' 21 5 This kind of legal review, consisting of questioning of methods and results and warnings that the
agency approached the unreasonable point,2 16 yet refusing to overturn
due to agency deference, is of questionable value. He warned the
Commissioners that they did the bare minimum of review, yet he deferred to their decision and admonished them not to act in an ad hoc
way in the future. In the future, therefore, the NRC must conduct a
review of the effects on only the global commons and United States
territory, and only a thorough enough review to avoid a label of abuse
of discretion.
The NRC justified much of its limited review on foreign policy
grounds, fearing the Philippines would take offense if the United States
tried to assure as safe an export as possible. The Commission is correct
in noting that a United States review cannot replace effective domestic
regulation, yet this does not lead to the conclusion that no review prior
to export is in order. Rather, as Commissioner Bradford noted in his
dissent, it is just because the United States will have little control over
operation that "we should at least do what we reasonably can" to assure safety.2 17 Rather than being an invasion of foreign sovereignty, a
review of this nature would "presume the intelligent self-interest of the
basis as a posirecipient nations and could be offered on a cooperative
2 18
tive benefit of the United States export process."
Judge Robinson acknowledged that a compromise review might
be beneficial. He took exception to the Commission's assertion that a
review of the impact upon the Philippines would serve no purpose
since it could not assure safety during operation, agreeing with Commissioner Bradford that at least a limited review designed to catch
213. Id. at 1370.
214. Id. at 1389.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1379, 1384.

217. 11 N.R.C., supra note 16, at 667 n.4.
218. Id. at 668.
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obvious flaws could have been conducted.2 19
Since the Commissioners of the NRC disagree as to their statutory
duty, and the jurists of the court of appeals find the legislative statutes
and history ambiguous, Congress should settle the question. It is a
decision for Congress and not for the Commissioners to determine the
role the NRC should play in the export of nuclear technology.
A possible solution would be to leave the decision on nuclear export licenses solely to the State Department. If the NRC continues to
limit its review to largely foreign policy concerns, the State Department, with its greater expertise, might as well be solely responsible.
But, the NRC has technical expertise in this field, and it would be a
better use of resources to have the NRC conduct a technical review,
leaving the foreign policy concerns to other departments within the executive branch.
The goal of NNPA was to establish the United States as a reliable
supplier of nuclear technology and to offer nuclear exports only to
those nations that would agree to our nonproliferation standards, It is
thus counterproductive for any export to be licensed if it is not as safe
as possible. The NRC should have a definite, unambiguous mandate
to conduct as thorough a review as necessary to assure that the United
States government does not license for export any nuclear technology
that may prove to be unnecessarily hazardous.

219. NRDC v. NRC, supra note 3, at 1378-79.

